| | | | | 基于共同治理的管理者财务激励模型研究 | | | 油晓峰 | | | 结合资本结构理论,本文提出了财务激励的过程再造的基本模型。在模型中,如果债务没有风险,股东和经营管理者将会以一定比例共同去影响激励过程;如果债务存在风险,本文提出了债权人直接参与财务激励的过程,这与传统的激励过程可能有所区别,但显然这种方式更有效率。
【作者单位】：山西财经大学财政金融学院 山西
【关键词】：激励;股东;经营管理者;债权人
【分类号】：F275
【DOI】：CNKI:SUN:ZGRK.0.2007-10-017
【正文快照】：
一、理论综述 激励的重要性在许多理论文献的叙述中都有所体现。激励与资本结构结合在一起进行研究,本文称之为财务激励。在资本结构的理论文献中,詹森(Jensen)和麦克林(Meekling)川、罗斯(Ross)[’]、梅耶斯(Myers)和迈基里夫(Majluf)[’]分别提出了激励的重要性。詹森和麦克 | | |
| | |  推荐 CAJ下载  PDF下载 | | | CAJViewer7.0阅读器支持所有CNKI文件格式，AdobeReader仅支持PDF格式 | | | | A Study of Manager Financial Incentive Model Based on Co-governance | | | YOU Xiao-feng (School of Finance and Banking;Shanxi Finance and Economics University;Taiyuan 030012;China) | | | A basic model for financial incentive process reengineering was proposed in this article based on the capital structural theory.The conclusion is that:if there is no risk in the debt,the shareholder and manager will affect the in- centive process together by certain proportion;on the other hand,If the debt has risk,the creditor will participate in the financial incentive process directly.Although this incentive process is different to the traditional process possibly,the former is more effective obviously.
【Keyword】：incentive;shareholder;manager;creditor |
|
|