| | | | | 谈对董事会的控制问题——兼谈独立董事制度 | | | 董新凯 | | | 董事会的权力日益膨胀 ,为了防止此种权力的滥用而有必要对董事会的行为进行控制。传统的控制机制以保护股东利益为宗旨 ,有很多缺陷 ;为了修正传统的控制机制 ,职工董事、职工股东、累积投票制、代理投票权竞争、要约收购等控制措施应运而生 ,但它们也有各自的缺陷。独立董事制度是一种较好的控制机制 ,其价值目标在于保证董事会的行为符合公司全体相关利益者的要求 ;但该机制价值的实现有赖于其内容设计的合理性。
【作者单位】：江苏商业管理干部学院 江苏南京210007
【关键词】：董事会;控制机制;相关利益;独立董事
【分类号】：D912.29
【DOI】：cnki:ISSN:1000-5307.0.2002-01-009
【正文快照】：
一、对董事会进行控制的传统机制 自 2 0世纪以来 ,在公司组织机构的权力分配上 ,股东会的地位逐渐下降 ,开始将公司的经营决策权转移至董事会 ,董事会的地位不断提高 ,并形成“董事会中心主义”现象。〔1〕 (Ｐ88)“董事会中心主义”是一把双刃剑 ,一方面 ,其强化了董事会 | | |
| | |  推荐 下载CAJ全文  下载PDF全文 | | | CAJViewer7.0阅读器支持所有CNKI文件格式，AdobeReader仅支持PDF格式 | | | | On the Control of Board of Directors | | | DONG Xin-kai | | | The power of board of directors is constantly expanding. In order to prevent this kind of power be abused, it is necessary to control the behavior of the board of directors. Traditional control mechanism that mainly protects the shareholders' interest has many drawbacks. Independent director mechanism is a better control mechanism and the value target of Independent director mechanism is to guarantee the behavior of board of directors been conformed to the demands of all interrelated interest parties. Of cause the realization of such value target rests on the rationality of its content design.
【Keyword】：board of directors;control mechanism;interrelated interests;independent director |
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